



**UNESCO Cymru-Wales**



**Pwyllgor Cenedlaethol  
National Committee**

**Rapporteur's Report**

***'Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control: Lessons for Trust-Building'***

*Workshop held at the Temple of Peace  
Cathays Park, Cardiff, 1-2 February 2008*

**Session 1: Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament: the Past as Prologue**

The first speaker provided an historical overview of nuclear disarmament efforts since 1945. He suggested that the ups and downs in these endeavours have been closely linked to the ups and downs in the broader political climate. He also argued that after the initial attempts to achieve complete nuclear disarmament had failed, the focus moved to more partial measures and then to two main projects conceived in the 1960s. One of these was to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons through multilateral instruments like the NPT and the safeguards of the IAEA. The second was to control the strategic nuclear forces of the two largest possessors by restricting missile defences. He then argued that these two projects came under

increasing question from the late 1990s: the first because it was becoming clear that the multilateral instruments alone would not be sufficient to prevent determined states from proliferating; the second because growing concerns about the proliferation of missiles made missile defences more attractive, while the end of the Cold War suggested that their limited deployment need not put an end to effort to control offensive nuclear forces. He concluded that, despite the current gloom in some circles about the prospects for arms control, it is too early to despair of their future. Measures have been introduced to supplement the multilateral non-proliferation instruments, and overall the number of nuclear warheads in the world continues to reduce. Moreover, the political wheel of fortune may once again turn in favour of instruments like the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The speaker argued that the British Government is committed to moving forward on these subjects and to engendering new momentum both in non-proliferation efforts (as evidenced by its role in international efforts to deal with Iran's nuclear activities) and in nuclear disarmament efforts (as evidenced by various recent Ministerial speeches on the subject and practical work by AWE on the techniques needed to verify warhead dismantlement).

The second speaker spoke about alternative ways for multilateral practitioners to think about how they tackle the challenges of nuclear disarmament. Drawing on a research project he has led at UNIDIR on *Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: Making Multilateral Negotiations Work*, he discussed this from the perspective of examining how negotiators handle uncertainty, or whether they indeed always recognize it. In general, disarmament diplomats spend a remarkable proportion of their time and energies vying over matters of procedure in multilateral processes. But they seem to give little sustained thought to whether and how their perceptions, habits of work and the nature of the structures they work within might be

important to their effectiveness: he described this as the 'cognitive ergonomics' of multilateral negotiating.

Generic 'lack of political will' explanations were often insufficient in usefully explaining success or failure in multilateral negotiation. Negotiators are also heavily dependent on social transactions between each other to build trust, and their level of performance matters in making multilateral negotiations work. So, the nature and structure of multilateral interactions is worth further scrutiny. Multilateral environments that promote and facilitate contact, as well as the development of trust between practitioners enabling more flexible arrangements for dialogue and the emergence of cooperation, are likely to be more productive. Small gains in this respect, he suggested, could yield big benefits, and he outlined some types of misperception and bias that can negatively influence common purpose, stifling possibilities for cooperation and putting negotiators in the wrong frame of mind. These include *false polarization* (that we perceive the stance of another on an issue to be extremely different from our own or 'polar' when they are usually not), *inferred ideological differences* leading parties in a negotiation to assume their interests are incompatible, and the *fixed pie bias*: this is the belief that the interests of negotiators are diametrically opposed and that gains for some must be at the expense of others. This can lead both sides to assume that a mutually beneficial agreement is impossible and that negotiating positions are "set-in-stone". But we know from research in multilateral processes that the expectations and interests of states are *not* usually fixed in reality, he said.

There is also the potential for conflict between fundamental and instrumental preferences—the difference between ends and means. In the event of an impasse, one can change the structure of negotiation, do nothing, or identify a subgroup that has shared fundamental preferences and

work in parallel to the existing structure. He pointed out, based on detailed observations, that this had yet to happen in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, but suggested that it had worked in other disarmament-related contexts to general benefit. He also argued that the input and pressure of transnational civil society could help negotiations achieve successful outcomes, but observed that these pressures had been notably absent in relation to nuclear disarmament in recent times. Finally, he highlighted the need for greater *cognitive diversity* among negotiators, which he argued is key to fostering conditions for serendipitous moments of breakthrough in collective problem-solving: often this was limited in disarmament forums, especially those in which civil society access was limited.

In discussion, some of the participants questioned UK officials at the meeting as to how the British Government could reconcile a modernisation of Trident with its declaratory commitment to nuclear disarmament. The official reply was that the United Kingdom was maintaining and not upgrading an existing capability, and that the British nuclear stockpile had been reduced since the late 1990s to less than 160 warheads. It was also emphasised that while British nuclear weapons were a hedge against an uncertain world, the UK's position did not breach its obligations under the NPT, and it remained committed to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons with the realisation that this will not likely be accomplished in the short-term.

Another contributor asked whether the recent interest in nuclear power has increased the difficulty to achieve total disarmament since this spreads nuclear technology to an ever increasing number of states. A speaker responded that it was unclear whether there really was a so-called 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power yet, but that if there were to be then the key would be to ensure that states continued to have access to civil nuclear power while ensuring

that this did not lead to proliferation. This could not be achieved simply by refusing them access to the sensitive parts of the fuel-cycle (uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities), but incentives, such as fuel assurances, might encourage them not to acquire these technologies. One speaker suggested that while the policies of the United States are an important factor here, even more important has been the relationship between Russia and the West. He suggested that if this relationship was stronger, it would be far easier to deal with states currently out of compliance with their non-proliferation obligations, especially Iran and the DPRK.

The question of the level of mistrust in the CD by non-Western countries was raised. A speaker replied that this mistrust exists, but that the atmosphere has improved. He pointed out that there is great diversity within the so-called Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). He reflected that, in his experience, trust was generated between negotiators through informal coffees and other mechanisms. The relationships that develop between individuals during negotiations can be very important, and he cited the example of the interpersonal chemistry between Clive Pearson and his US counterparts which was influential in securing progress at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Another participant wanted to know if the fervour that the Russians displayed over the Czech missile shield was irrational. Likewise, there was a question as to whether the American fear of rogue states is even more irrational, since they are based on weapons systems that do not currently exist. One of the speakers noted that the missile shield idea might be seen as posing a challenge to MAD upon which strategic stability rested since the Cold War. Nevertheless, since the current US plans are too small to provide a real defence against the Russian arsenal, he suggested that Moscow's decision to object to US National Missile Defence (NMD) was

difficult to understand strategically. However, another contributor disagreed, noting that even a limited missile shield could become highly significant in a world where the nuclear weapons states (NWS) had embarked upon a process of nuclear disarmament.

## **Session 2: Trust but Verify**

The first speaker spoke on the topic of 'Trusting? Verifying? Panicking? The international approach to Iran's nuclear programme'. She suggested that Iran is a good case for illustrating the problem of verifying commitments and building trust. From the Iranian perspective, the reaction of the West to their nuclear programs has been marked by inconsistency. Iran was one of the first countries to sign the NPT and received generous support from the West to develop civilian reactors. After the revolution in 1979, the nuclear reactors served as a reminder of the Shah's decadent regime and its relationship with the West, so the new government in Tehran scaled back the program to the point that both France and Germany took them to court for breaching contracts. Subsequently, the discovery of the scale of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program during the 1991 Gulf War caused Iran to develop a similar program, which, after the shock of the Iraqi program, led the West to become suspicious. The speaker argued that the key source of the mistrust between Iran and Western governments was that the latter project their own insecurities onto Iran, assuming that if we were Iran, we would be building nuclear weapons.

There have been coordination problems in dealing with Iran partially because multiple tracks (IAEA, EU3, the P-5+1 (Germany), and the Security Council) are occurring simultaneously. No doubt such inconsistency breaks trust, but at least now there is a coherent message. To date, the IAEA has had the most consistent approach and an increased level of legitimacy because of its multilateral status.

Verification can be problematic as it is never perfect but can lull countries into a false sense of security. Verification is only one strand in a larger information-gathering process that includes the media, NGOs, and more secret information gathering exercises. Whether it is possible to create a new relationship with Iran is uncertain, but trust is at the heart of this question. We have to ask ourselves if sanctions and military attack can successfully promote changes in Tehran's behaviour. It is important to focus not just on enrichment at the expense of other outstanding issues. The Iranian case should be framed within the wider context of a renewed commitment to nuclear disarmament so that there is no perception of a double-standard. Here, she invited the nuclear weapon states to renew their NPT vows as a basis of establishing greater trust between the NWS and the non-NWS. The path to trust could be renewed if, for instance, a new US President re-ratifies the CTBT. We also need to handle the DPRK better, as this will have effects on the relationship with Iran. Finally, we need to appoint people to the negotiation table who work within the larger conceptual framework of a nuclear-free world, not those who are just there to make a deal.

The second speaker spoke on the topic of 'How much trust, through what kinds of cooperation, should nuclear verification reasonably require'? He saw arms control as a process of bargains and balances. In order to make the process work the apprehensions of both sides must be met. Trust must be seen as a reasonable possibility that is worth working for. Inspections are an important component, but they can not be the whole solution as they can become an opportunity for political drama. There is a political requirement and public expectation that states which are suspected of nuclear weapon ambitions reassure the international community of the peaceful nature of their nuclear programmes. Iran, for example, has never seriously engaged in such a process of openness and accountability, and

there seem to be very few justifications for such secrecy if its nuclear intentions are peaceful ones. She recognised that there could be a military justification for secrecy because reportedly the United States has used information from previous weapons inspections for targeting purposes. However, there is already a considerable amount of information in the public realm here, and it is unclear how much more information can be gained from mining the data from the verification process. There are potential economic justifications for secrecy, but it is unclear what aspects of a civilian nuclear sector are so commercially sensitive that inspectors should be denied unfettered access.

He suggested that we need to create a situation where governments accept an increasing level of access and transparency to successfully communicate their peaceful intentions to others within the NPT regime. The speaker argued that what was needed was a conversation in which the trustee (the state which is seeking to show its trustworthiness) engages in a conversation with trustors demonstrating the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities. Demanding a well-supported conversation is not a weak measure – it can be very effective. This has to be kept separate from an understanding of motivation and historical context and it needs to be backed by a sense that there are consequences to the dialogue. Crucially, there must be willingness to act if trust is broken.

In discussion, some participants suggested that far from being on the defensive, Iranian leaders believe they are winning in the Middle East, despite Tehran having been sanctioned by the UN Security Council. The worry was expressed that if Tehran does see itself as increasing its regional power, it will make it much more difficult to bring Iran into compliance with its international obligations. Conversely, others argued that although Iran may have scored some important political points, its defiance of the Security Council has not



been a costless action, both in terms of the alarm Tehran has caused its neighbours and the increased exposure to the use of force from Washington or Tel Aviv to halt its nuclear ambitions.

Some contributors thought that it was difficult to talk about trust in the nuclear area, and some questioned whether you could build trust with despotic regimes. Specifically, how can the West trust the Islamic Republic if it denies the Holocaust? Others believed that such ideological differences had to be compartmentalised so as not to derail the possibility of reducing mistrust and developing cooperation in the nuclear area. Here, a parallel was drawn with superpower arms control in the 1970s. The United States and the Soviet Union did not allow their competition for influence in the Third World to derail SALT, at least in the early part of the 1970s. Another example of such compartmentalisation is Burma which, as one participant pointed out, is an important player in the NPT despite its abysmal human rights record. Those who favoured compartmentalisation suggested that if progress could be made in the nuclear area it might spill-over and lead to cooperation in other areas of the relationship.

Another contributor asked what the speakers' conceptions of trust were, given that he personally defined it as 'confidence without knowledge'. It seemed to him that the speakers were using a loose conception of trust, and that if verification is central, then trust cannot be achieved as mandatory verification is hostile to the creation of trust. The second speaker responded by questioning whether such an approach to trust could ever be operationalised at the international level given the costs of misplaced trust, and that politicians would struggle to legitimate such an approach to domestic publics. Rather, there are certain things that must be verified if trust is to exist. This should not be taken as an insult, because a pattern of non-

compliance leads to the suspicion that a state might have something to hide. In reply to the contention that suspect states have to demonstrate their trustworthiness to trustors, the questioner made a parallel with a marriage ceremony. When a couple say their vows, they do not add that they will be employing a private investigator to verify that the husbands or wives are complying with their commitments.

### **Session 3 - The Security Council as a Trustee for Nuclear Order**

The first speaker spoke on the role of the Security Council, specifically about Article 24 of the UN Charter that confers on the Security Council the 'primary responsibility' for maintaining international peace and security. In discharging this function, the Security Council acts on behalf of all UN members. Any UN body, including the IAEA, has the right to refer subjects to the Security Council. On 28 April 2004, Resolution 1540 was adopted under the Chapter VII provisions of the Charter. This obliged member states to refrain from supplying any components related to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, or their delivery systems, to non-state actors. The speaker argued that this was an example of the Security Council acting to enforce universal non-proliferation norms.

In its role as a trustee of the global nuclear order, the speaker believed that the specific policies of the Security Council should be set given the particular circumstances of each case. For example, it was important that China was agreeable to Security Council action in relation to the DPRK after Pyongyang's missile tests in 2006. He argued in relation to Iran that the Security Council's role had been pivotal, and if it could stay united might yet succeed in bringing Iran into compliance with Resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747. However, he cautioned that trust does not easily exist in this domain.

The second speaker spoke on the elusiveness of trust in the experience of the Security Council and Iran. He contended that Iranians do not see themselves as part of the 'axis of evil'. They have a very high opinion of themselves, based partly on claims to being the cradle of civilization. The people in the Middle East see a pattern of discrimination against them. For example, the West, especially the United States, continuously veto any resolutions that negatively affect Israel. They see this as systematic unequal treatment. Similarly, during the invasion of Iraq, the United States did not really bother to go through the UN process. Iranians believe themselves to be an aggrieved party in the international system. In this regard, the speaker cited the fact that nothing was done after Iraq attacked Iran with chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War, and though reparations were paid from Iraq to Kuwait, there were no similar reparations for Iran. He claimed that after Iran's clandestine program to enrich uranium had been discovered, they came clean and accepted the Additional Protocol as well as suspending enrichment activities for two years. Despite this, they were still included in President Bush's 'axis of evil' speech in January 2002.

Some of the audience considered that the United States should have responded positively in 2003 to Iranian overtures to create a better relationship. It was pointed out that the response of the neoconservatives to the apparent Iranian trust-building move – 'we don't speak to evil' – strengthened the hard-liners in the Iranian regime. On the other side of the ledger, it was pointed out that Iran had not responded favourably to the overtures of the Clinton Administration which included Secretary of State Albright apologising to Tehran for the US role in the coup of 1953. Another contributor remarked that the Islamic Republic had not responded positively to the offer put by the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Dr. Javier Solana. This would have begun a dialogue without preconditions between the E-3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) and Iran, leading

hopefully to the suspension of both Tehran's enrichment activities and the limited sanctions which the Security Council had imposed in Resolution 1737. The inducement for the Islamic Republic being that this would have opened the door to Washington joining the dialogue, bringing with it the possibility of security guarantees.

It was pointed out that Iran consumes a lot of energy which helps explain its interest in developing nuclear power, and there was a general consensus that Iran was entitled to the peaceful uses of nuclear power. However, it was also pointed out by some participants that this entitlement, and Iran's economic needs for energy, did not require Tehran to develop those sensitive aspects of the fuel-cycle which caused so much suspicion in the West (e.g. enrichment). One contributor remarked in relation to whether Iran could be trusted with mastery of the fuel cycle that it was difficult to trust a regime that wants the destruction of another UN member and which denies the holocaust. In trying to explore a way forward, it was pointed out that with the issue now in the hands of the Security Council, it was difficult for Iran to back down without it being seen as a humiliating retreat. In this regard, it was suggested that perhaps the advent of a new US administration in 2009 would lead to a softening of positions on both sides.

Other contributors returned to themes from previous sessions, noting that there is a long history of undeclared nuclear activity on the part of the Islamic Republic, and that in addition its subsequent actions have not sent a consistent message of reassurance to the international community, with the result that this has led to increasing concern about its nuclear activities. Iran has continued to pour resources into conversion and enrichment plans, even though the Russians are providing the fuel for the only power reactor so far built in Iran (at Bushehr). There was a widespread feeling – though not shared by all participants – that the pressure will

have to be increased on Tehran in terms of tougher sanctions if it does not come into compliance with the existing Security Council resolutions. Accepting that Iran was building up a military infrastructure that could support a nuclear weapons programme, one participant asked whether the challenge facing Western governments was to reassure Tehran so that it could have greater trust in US intentions. The question here was not whether the Western powers could trust Iran's nuclear intentions, but rather how much could the Islamic Republic trust the West?

#### **Session 4 - The Prospects for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament**

The first speaker spoke on the prospects for global nuclear disarmament as seen from the perspective of the P5. He pointed out that it was difficult to talk in terms of a single view here. That said, there have been occasions when a singular position was adopted such as the agreement on the steps to be taken at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. While this was not quite a universal consensus – some of the P5 were happier with it than others – the 2000 agreement nevertheless remains the closest the P-5 have come to a united position. There has been backsliding on many of the points, especially the CTBT. The speaker asked what counts as acceptable and unacceptable nuclear behaviour in terms of the P5. What constitutes strategic stability in such an order? Can we create a forum divorced from political issues where nuclear states can discuss nuclear issues? Which states are essential within it?

He suggested the following questions to think about: is disarmament an end state or a process? If disarmament is regarded as an 'end state', how do you prevent against break-out from it? In this regard, he considered that a key challenge was to ensure that disarmament did not lead to increased instability. Is it a process where some nuclear weapon states will retain some nuclear weapons or is it a process leading to global zero? He suggested that academics

and practitioners have never seriously explored what might be meant by disarmament – is it the literal elimination, or just the disassembling of weapons so that warning time is increased in times of crisis? Are we getting rid of something we see as bad, or does disarmament fall within a larger framework of lessening conflicts? Will this process be global from the start, or dealt with regionally in the beginning, especially since the drivers behind nuclear weapons acquisition tend to be regional rather than global? To what extent can we think about nuclear disarmament apart from issues of general disarmament? For example, he asked how the Russian Federation can be persuaded to cut its nuclear weapons if this will leave it exposed to superior US conventional forces. Turning to the position of France, he asked whether Paris will give up its nuclear weapons if it thinks they enhance its security outside of NATO. And can China be expected to join a process of disarmament while it remains concerned about the US development of missile defences, which it fears might embolden Washington in future crises over Taiwan? As for the United States, how far would the new interest in some US circles in moving to zero be seen by other members of the P5 (crucially Russia and China) as an attempt to develop a position of primacy based on its conventional capabilities? The UK has been prominent in recent months in pressing nuclear disarmament issues, and the speaker asked how this process might be advanced. In this context, the speaker asked whether US nuclear developments over the last decade – such as the development of very low yield weapons – indicated that the world is moving in the direction of what Lewis Dunn had once called the ‘conventionalization of nuclear weapons’.

Moving beyond the P5 to discuss the N-3/4 (India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea), he asked, how can you discuss disarmament with Israel if it's not prepared to disclose that it has nuclear weapons? With regard to Indo-Pakistan nuclear relation, attention was drawn to the importance of Beijing's nuclear forces in any future arms control/disarmament context.

Finally, the question of the DPRK's nuclear status was raised: should North Korea be recognised as a nuclear weapons state or be seen as a pariah outside of the existing regime? The question raised by these issues was whether any future process of disarmament was best pursued through the P5 or some wider mechanism involving the nine nuclear weapon states (or eight depending on how one views Israel's stance of nuclear ambiguity).

The speaker finished by raising some general points about trust in relation to these issues. He suggested that one place where nuclear weapons appeared to have no role in interstate relations was in the EU context. Here, he suggested that the US-UK nuclear relationship depended crucially on relations of trust. Finally, and raising a question which goes to the heart of the DDMI's research on trust-building in world politics, he asked whether trust as a concept was applicable to relations between bureaucracies and governments, or was it only applicable to relations between human agents?

The second speaker spoke on the topic of 'A View from the Non-Nuclear Weapons States.' He noted that non-nuclear states must accept the NPT, whereas a different set of rules apply to the P5, although the latter cannot withdraw from the NPT whether they like it or not. He argued that Article VI was the cornerstone of the NPT with its commitment to nuclear disarmament, though there might be other ways forward as well. For example, the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) had declared their region a nuclear-weapon free zone. He suggested that this was a positive step that other regions should emulate.

In discussion, one contributor asked how processes of globalisation affect the desire of countries to keep or dispose of nuclear weapons. A speaker noted that this was a problem,

and wondered to what extent we are moving from a system of state-regulated activities to one in which networks are emerging that operate below the radar of the state. How are these going to be controlled? How much responsibility can we leave to global capitalist networks to deal with controlling the production of fissile materials? This, he argued, raises questions about the function of the modern state.

Another participant noted that a precondition of a final negotiation leading to zero is resolving regional conflicts. This can not come from the NPT community, but rather from global leadership. In response, one of the speakers suggested that the evidence is not conclusive on this matter. There were three states in the 1990s that pulled back from having nuclear weapons – Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa. He argued that the main reason for this was the transition from military dictatorships to democracies. The Israel situation is a classic chicken and egg situation. Do nuclear weapons exacerbate the conflict or might progress on the nuclear issue spill-over into helping Israel and the Arab states move to a political solution? In reply, one participant challenged the conventional wisdom that getting to zero is a problem because of the lack of trust. Using the metaphor of a coastline, he suggested that getting to the coastline of zero was hard, but once you get close to zero, the dynamics of disarmament will be much easier because of the trust that will have been built up through the disarmament process, crucially the change of identities on the part of previously adversarial states. He pointed to the EU as an example of this, and argued that the security community that the European states have created since 1945 is an example of the way in which changed identities can promote trust. However, in response to an earlier suggestion that Libya's decision to give up WMD could be seen as an example of trust-building, he questioned whether the Libyan case was analogous to the EU one because there had been no bonding between societies in the Libyan case. Rather, it has been at the level of leaders, and this left the process of trust



vulnerable to changes in the leadership group in Tripoli. The speaker responded that we do need to think about this as a dynamic process. It has to do with momentum and atmospherics, but he questioned whether this was the same as trust.

### **Roundtable - Trust and Mistrust in the Search for Nuclear Disarmament**

The first speaker noted that the concept of trust is the least developed in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament. Yet, at the same time it is crucial to any process of international cooperation. It is created through constructive dialogue, cross-cultural tolerance, building mutual understanding, and discovering common interests and goals. A process of nuclear disarmament based on trust requires a reduction in the nuclear arsenals of the P5, Iran and the DPRK, a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, and controls over the spread of nuclear capabilities to non-state actors. On the positive side, proliferation occurs on a limited scale – mostly in South Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East. Progress can only be made if we deal with two things at the same time: peace and security plus nuclear disarmament and arms control. He suggested that the Helsinki process that started in Europe in the early 1970s was a good example of how we can achieve these issues successfully. What was needed was a similar Helsinki-style approach to a WMD-free zone in the Middle East; one that like Helsinki embraced trust between societies as well as leaders. Nevertheless, dramatic moves that can build trust were essential to get the process going, and here the speaker pointed to the example of Sadat going to Jerusalem and publicly recognising Israel's right to exist. If the barriers to trust are to be overcome in the Middle East, he argued that Israel would have to put its nuclear weapons into the process, accepting as a starting point IAEA safeguards on its undeclared nuclear facility at Dimona.

It was emphasised that we need to bring down the psychological barriers of history to build trust. We also need trust-building measures between societies. He believed that there has been a lack of awareness in civil society about the facts of non-proliferation and disarmament. Raising consciousness about such issues was an important role for NGOs. In relation to failed or semi-failed states, there was a need to engage them so that they do not become a haven for terrorist groups, possibly ones committed to acquiring WMD. Finally, he issued a call for the CD to take the initiative in developing new trust-building mechanisms to manage the dangers of the spread of fissile materials.

The second speaker spoke on the Foreign Office sponsored project being conducted at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) on nuclear disarmament. He began by noting that the report was seeking to locate itself in the middle ground on a continuum of trust and mistrust: on the one hand, it rejected the excess of trust exhibited by some advocates of disarmament, but on the other, it wanted to avoid the excess of distrust which would scupper any schemes for breaking through the nuclear disarmament deadlock. He emphasised the point made by a previous speaker that any steps towards disarmament had to lead to increased and not decreased security and stability. He also stressed that as the world moved closer to zero, there would be a need for ever increasing levels of verification. The Additional Protocol was an important step here, but it would be necessary to go well beyond this level of intrusion if the nuclear powers were to have the confidence to rid themselves of nuclear weapons. A key requirement of a disarmed world would be limitations on enrichment and reprocessing facilities, but could a consensus be achieved on this if the P5 did not disarm first? And how might the sequencing work here? He suggested that the report would seek greater credibility by exploring these issues (and others like hedging, enforcement etc) in relation to the most difficult regional contexts, for example South Asia and the Middle East.

The third speaker believed that there is a common perception that nuclear weapon states want to hang on to their weapons at all costs, and this complicates efforts to persuade Iran to comply with non-proliferation norms. He suggested that much of the discussion about trust at the workshop had revolved around what he saw as a negative conception of trust – ‘do I trust X to do what I want?’ Alternatively, he suggested that we think of trust in a more positive manner by taking the first steps in creating a security community. He considered that one of the major obstacles in moving towards disarmament is the West's relationship with Russia. The trust that existed between Russia and the West in the early 1990s is now seriously degraded, for a number of reasons. After the collapse of the USSR the West did not help enough with security on Russia's new borders. Instead, they imposed a Western model of economic system which degraded much of Russia's social infrastructure. Furthermore, the enlargement of NATO gave priority to the security concerns of Poles and Czechs over those of Moscow, and the West's involvement in the Kosovo Crisis and the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine created an atmosphere of growing mistrust.

The final speaker believed that we need to establish a widespread trust, not just between state A and state B, but between state A and all the other states in the system in order to move towards nuclear disarmament. It is not just a question of building trust between human agents, but also between institutions, organisations and processes; these also need integrity. There is a whole web of organisations needed to create confidence. The ability to respond properly to non-compliance through regulatory agencies is also important. There needs to be trust in the power of certain foundational norms and rules so that even contemplating using nuclear weapons will be a shameful act. Overall, there have to be many layers of trust established, not just between states.

He suggested that a 'leap of trust' is needed to move forward. This requires a situation where the decision made would be of great cost if not followed, and great benefit if followed. In the early 1990s there was such a leap, but in the late 1990s, the speaker suggested that this had mutated into a leap of *mistrust*. He likened building trust to unravelling a great big knot, turning it backwards, and having a straight piece of string. Arms control prevents the knot from becoming tightened, but there's also an alternative method to try and slice through the knot. Complications can be disincentives until you slice through them and agree just to do something.

In discussion, it was recommended that think-tanks link academics and diplomats to allow the latter to take extra dimensions into their work. Research institutes are important because questions can be asked beyond those of other groups who might be limited politically. This allows you to do some serious work in a relaxed manner.

There was also discussion about strategy, with one participant noting how far tit-for-tat strategies to escape the prisoner's dilemma can breakdown. Others noted that there is a link between crises and opportunities for change – the knot will only be cut in the aftermath of some negative transformative event. Others wondered whether getting to the edge of catastrophe was critical in leading to new cooperative policies, and here contributors cited the cases of the Cuban missile crisis and the 1983 Able Archer crisis. This opened up the question of the relationship between risk and trust: there were no risk-free futures, but did the building of trust require taking risks that few state leaders will be prepared to contemplate? Or, does the case of Reagan and Gorbachev show that trust can be built in ways that do not sacrifice the vital interests of the major states? These questions led to no conclusive answers,

but all the participants agreed that these were issues that should be the subject of future research.

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