| Module Identifier | EC30110 | ||
| Module Title | OLIGOPOLY AND INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY | ||
| Academic Year | 2002/2003 | ||
| Co-ordinator | Professor John R Cable | ||
| Semester | Semester 1 | ||
| Pre-Requisite | EC30230 | ||
| Mutually Exclusive | EC31510 | ||
| Course delivery | Lecture | 10 Hours | |
| Seminars / Tutorials | 4 Hours | ||
| Assessment | Semester Exam | 1.5 Hours | 100% | 
	Oligopolistic interdependence
	Incidence of oligopoly
	Modelling problems
	Game theory:  history and method
	Reading:
	Gibbons, Preface
	Lyons and Varoufakis, pp.79-83
	Dixon, pp.127-128
2.	A normal form game:  the Prisoners' Dilemma
	Description of normal form games
	The Prisoners' Dilemma game
	Strategic dominance as solution concept
	Reading:
	Gibbons, Ch 1, pp.1-8
3.	Nash Equilibrium and Static Oligopoly Models
	
	Nash Equilibrium
	Cournot oligopoly
	Bertrand oligopoly
	Welfare comparisons
	Reading:
	Gibbons, Ch 1, pp.8-22
	Lyons and Varoufakis, pp.84-88
	Dixon, pp.128-136
 
4.	Dynamic Games and Leader – Follower Behaviour
	Description of dynamic games
	Extensive form:  'game trees'
	Backwards induction
	Stackelberg equilibrium
	Welfare comparisons
	Reading:
	Gibbons, Ch 2, pp.55-64
	Dixon, pp.128-136
5.	Perfect Equilibrium and Market Entry in Dynamic Games
	The two stage entry game
	Perfect equilibrium
	Entry deterrence:  the role of commitment and reputation
	Reading:
	Gibbons, Ch 2, pp.71-73
	Lyons and Varoufakis, pp.88-91
	Dixon, pp.145-155
6.	Repeated Games
	Co-operative Behaviour
	Finitely repeated games
	The chain-store paradox and two-period Prisoners' Dilemma
	Infinitely repeated games
	Co-operation in the Prisoners' Dilemma
	Collusion amongst oligopolists:  cartels and tacit collusion
	Welfare comparisons
	Reading:
	Gibbons, Ch 2, pp.82-107
	Lyons and Varoufakis, pp.99-106
	Dixon, pp.155-161